Each time tensions between Turkey and Israel subside or diminish because of new developments, the flames of disagreement reignite, clearly indicating that Ankara has become Israel’s main challenge after all the recent developments that have reshaped the region. The major transformations in the Middle East in recent years, including the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a series of Israeli strikes targeting the Iran-led axis that includes “Hamas” and “Hezbollah,” and the subsequent weakening of that axis, have opened the way for Turkey’s return as a central regional player.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has skillfully exploited these developments to his advantage since the Israeli strikes in Lebanon, achieving far greater regional influence than before in Syria, along with growing power in other regions such as Asia and Africa. This time, however, and this is what worries the Israelis, Turkey will not simply become another Iran in the region but something stronger. As the leader of the Sunni axis, Turkey is backed by an American umbrella of protection that Iran never had, coupled with economic and military advantages as a member of NATO, factors that Iran could never possess.

For Israel, this means that Turkey, under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood–inspired Justice and Development Party, can now extend its influence and lead what Israelis describe as the “radical Sunni axis” seeking to reshape the region. It does so while facing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who, according to his critics, has become isolated and politically paralyzed in the United States. In recent weeks, Erdoğan has played a key role in pressuring “Hamas,” the Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, to accept U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Trump, in return, wants to reward Erdoğan by involving Turkey in Gaza’s reconstruction efforts as part of an international force to stabilize the situation. He considers Erdoğan a “noble man and a trustworthy ally” who succeeded in building a pragmatic and personal relationship with him, earning Trump’s confidence during their cooperation in Syria. Ankara, striving to return to the forefront after years of marginalization, sees this as an opportunity for Erdoğan to secure new domestic political credit as he portrays himself, with the help of loyal media outlets, as the leader of the Islamic world.

Israel, however, strongly rejects this role and sees it as a direct security threat. It is deeply concerned about any Turkish involvement in the region and is closely monitoring Ankara’s expansion to its north while accusing it of supporting “Hamas.” The situation has escalated to an open exchange of harsh accusations between Netanyahu and Erdoğan. Israeli right-wing figures argue that eliminating the threats of Iran and “Hezbollah” only to empower Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Gaza would not bring stability but would instead create a “security catastrophe.”

It is worth recalling that Turkey joined the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of committing genocide under occupation. A few days ago, Turkish courts issued 37 arrest warrants against Israeli officials on charges of “genocide and crimes against humanity” in Gaza. Those included in the warrants are Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir. Israel reacted strongly on the diplomatic front, describing Erdoğan as a tyrant and using the lawsuits in its efforts to block any Turkish presence in Gaza.

Nevertheless, Ankara appears determined, with American approval, to secure a share of the post-war reconstruction. On the reconstruction front, Turkey sees both an economic and a political opportunity. Turkish companies, with long-standing experience in infrastructure projects and debris removal, are well qualified to take part in ventures worth tens of billions of dollars. Turkey views this new role as a historic opportunity to regain its influence in the Middle East and strengthen its position with Washington.

A Turkish Counteroffensive and Arab Reservations

Meanwhile, a new sign of Turkey’s intentions appeared through a counteroffensive launched by Ankara just days after the Sharm el-Sheikh conference. In Istanbul, foreign ministers from several Islamic countries — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia — met and called for accelerating Palestinian reconciliation efforts and transferring Gaza’s administration to the Palestinian Authority within an internal Palestinian framework under Islamic sponsorship. They insisted on a fair and lasting resolution of the Palestinian issue as a condition for any administrative transfer of the Gaza Strip and proposed oversight mechanisms and follow-up committees to ensure the implementation of the plan’s second phase.

This was Turkey’s response to Israel, with Ankara acting as a guarantor alongside Qatar for “Hamas,” within an Arab and Islamic framework, prior to any appeal to the UN Security Council regarding the deployment of the proposed international force to Gaza, which Turkey has expressed interest in joining. Before the conference, Erdoğan conducted a rapid tour of Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman to consolidate his sources of support and gather regional backing for trade, investment, energy, and defense agreements.

However, Israel is also counting on the apprehension of some Arab countries toward any expansionist Turkish role in Gaza. The Arab role in reconstruction was already set from the beginning of the war to be led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while there are also reservations regarding Qatar itself. Israelis argue that Turkish involvement would mean a dangerous military presence for “Hamas” itself, something Arab capitals such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Amman reject. The message from Israel’s right-wing leaders to these capitals was clear: deploying Turkish forces inside Gaza would place a NATO-level military power side by side with “Hamas,” giving it an unprecedented opportunity to secure weapons and supplies and to benefit from professional combat support, which would effectively protect “Hamas” and reinforce its rule.

The Turkish-Israeli confrontation may reach its peak. Israel might succeed in sidelining Ankara, or the issue could be resolved by granting Turkey a broader role limited to political, economic, humanitarian, and reconstruction efforts, or a logistical role involving the supervision of aid corridors without any military deployment. Should Israel be compelled to accept such an arrangement, it would signal the nature of the next phase in the power struggle with Turkey — not only in Gaza but also in the wider arena of Syria, where the most critical front of the regional cold war between Greater Israel and the New Ottomanism is now unfolding.