the May 17 Agreement, signed in 1983. Less than half a century has passed since that political consequence of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which saw the Palestine Liberation Organization exiled to Tunisia, while other Palestinian factions sought refuge in Syria. For a moment, some Lebanese thought the war that had erupted on April 13, 1975, had finally come to an end.

The agreement was approved by Lebanon’s Parliament with a majority of 65 votes out of 99 members (seven of whom had passed away), in a session boycotted by 19 MPs. Two voted against it, three abstained, and one expressed reservations.

Brokered by the United States, the agreement was the result of negotiations between a Lebanese delegation led by Ambassador Antoine Fattal and an Israeli delegation led by Ambassador David Kimche. Talks took place between Khaldeh and Kiryat Shmona, starting on December 28, 1982. President Amine Gemayel sought Arab — including Syrian — support for the deal, dispatching presidential envoys across the Arab world to explain Lebanon’s objectives. The delegations returned with overall blessings and a general understanding of Lebanon’s move.

The main provisions of the agreement included: ending the state of war between Lebanon and Israel; a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon within 8 to 12 weeks; establishing a security zone within Lebanese territory under Lebanese government control in accordance with a special security annex; forming a tripartite U.S.-Israeli-Lebanese committee to oversee implementation, including security arrangements and subcommittees to manage bilateral relations; establishing liaison offices in both countries; negotiating trade agreements; and a mutual commitment to refrain from hostile propaganda.

As we briefly revisit the nature of the May 17 Agreement and compare it to the aftermath of the latest Israeli war on Lebanon — namely, the reinforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the insistence on its strict implementation — we notice numerous similarities. The language, procedures, and escalating conditions echo past events. Most recently, former U.S. President Donald Trump tied Lebanon’s economic recovery and financial assistance to peace with its neighbors. “Oh, neighbor, if only you’d take pity on me,” one might say. Are these so-called neighbors living on Mars?

At the time, the government and its supporters described the May 17 Agreement as a security arrangement. Its opponents, however, saw it as the second chapter of Arab capitulation following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.

Interestingly, Israel itself never ratified the agreement. Lebanon, on the other hand, annulled it after fierce internal opposition, the Mountain War on September 4, 1983, the Geneva and Lausanne conferences, and a power shift in Syria’s favor within Lebanon.

And now, 42 years later, we find ourselves facing circumstances that are strikingly similar — if not worse — than those surrounding an agreement that was eventually scrapped on March 5, 1984.

President Trump, who kicked off his second term with a Gulf tour (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE), reportedly lifted U.S. sanctions on Syria at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. For a brief moment, the Lebanese hoped this decision would bring immediate relief to their battered country. But then, they heard Trump say: “We are ready to help Lebanon build a future of economic development and peace with its neighbors”… and their hopes came crashing down.

Peace with its neighbors (again, “Oh neighbor!”) is now a prerequisite for Lebanon to receive U.S. — and consequently European and Arab — aid. Moreover, lifting sanctions on Syria, pending Congressional approval, nullifies the international community’s arguments for keeping Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011. The security reason for their stay has dissolved with the end of the war. The political excuse has vanished as Bashar al-Assad’s regime crumbles. The economic rationale has weakened with the lifting of Caesar Act sanctions, giving the Syrian people a breath of relief.

Between Trump’s thinly veiled suggestion that Lebanon must make peace with Israel to receive aid, and the apparent willingness of Syrian officials like Ahmed al-Sharaa to meet conditions for joining the Abraham Accords, Lebanon stands at a crossroads. The question is: What will Lebanon’s government do?

Will it cling to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, maintaining its long-standing position of being the last Arab country to sign a peace deal with Israel? Just yesterday, political leader Walid Jumblatt quipped: “Delay the peace a little for us,” as if conceding that it’s only a matter of time.

And will our government continue to mimic its predecessors since 2011 — either ignoring the Syrian refugee crisis, colluding with the international community to keep them in Lebanon, failing to take initiative, or surrendering to foreign agendas? Notably, several Lebanese officials have proposed solutions and taken action over the years, chief among them former President Michel Aoun, who twice raised the issue of Syrian refugee repatriation from the UN podium. His was a lone voice crying out in the wilderness. His political movement’s efforts, both in practice and through legislation, remain unheeded.

In the end — whether we like it or not, whether we support or oppose it, whether we accept it willingly or have it forced upon us, whether we resist or surrender — what lies ahead compels us to say:

May 17 sends its regards. Peace.