All what is emerging from the missions of the international and Arab envoys in Beirut, and from the communications and meetings among capitals involved in the Lebanese issue, amount so far to an attempt for reaching a temporary de-escalation — a provisional postponement of Israel’s military frenzy, as long as the threat posed by Hezbollah’s weapons remains in place, partly south of the Litani River and overwhelmingly north of it.

It is true that Lebanon’s decision to appoint a political negotiator to the “Mechanism” committee has partially defused the trigger of immediate escalation and opened a window of hope for containing the looming war. But the effort to exchange political negotiations for the cancellation of that war has failed, because Hezbollah continues to openly cling to its weapons and to consistently seek multifaceted Iranian backing — military, financial, and political — under Tehran’s renewed (and misleading) slogan that “the party is its own master,” echoing the late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s own phrase: “master in Iran” as well.

In parallel to Hezbollah’s refusal to relinquish its arsenal, Israel insists on justifying its continued airstrikes and assassinations as long as the Mechanism negotiations — technical and political — do nothing to address the weapons it considers a threat to its security, especially to its northern regions. For this reason, it draws a clear separation between its strikes and the ongoing negotiations, as stated by U.S. Ambassador to Beirut Michael Issa at the threshold of Ain al-Tineh.

This persistent impasse in resolving the Lebanese crisis conceals an Iranian agenda aimed at undermining the Lebanese state’s effort to reach a settlement or solution through direct negotiations — the only remaining option after the failure of the military avenues entrusted by the Supreme Leader to his Lebanese arm as a “religious mandate.”

Although Tehran is currently trying to avoid “drinking the cup” of war after witnessing its destructive effects during the recent 12-day round, it now realizes that negotiations with the United States (and with Israel) are the only viable path to achieving its central objective: the survival of its regime through the lifting of financial, economic, and political sanctions.

Hence its directives to the “leaders” of its Lebanese arm to obstruct — or at least disrupt — the decision taken by President Joseph Aoun, supported by Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, to engage in negotiations with Israel. In reality, Iran seeks to grant the negotiating opportunity to Hezbollah or to the “Shiite duo,” not the Lebanese state — exactly as happened in the maritime border negotiations of summer 2022.

At that time, the “duo” negotiated the substance, leaving the presidency with the form, visibility, and public announcements. The situation today is different: the “duo” now stands in the background while the state leads the negotiation initiative — a development that has roused the discomfort of the “Supreme Leadership.”

This shift is due to the military and political weakening Hezbollah has suffered as a result of the “support war,” and to the renewed momentum the Lebanese state has gained over the past year, despite the fragility of some of its structures and the stagnation of many of its decisions.

The key difference is that Iran now seeks, through negotiations, to save its “party,” not the Shiite community nor Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Lebanese state seeks to save Lebanon in its entirety — including the Shiite community, which is currently the most exposed and which is openly expressing increasing discontent and serious questions about Iran’s intentions, objectives, and endgame.

Broadly speaking, Iran strongly favors the negotiation option over the decision of war, knowing full well that victory is impossible. It seeks to test the effectiveness of this strategy through a preliminary, subsidiary experiment involving Hezbollah — on the condition that the negotiations appear to be conducted in Hezbollah’s name, not the name of the Lebanese presidency. If successful, the experience could then be elevated to the higher tripartite level: Iranian, American, and Israeli.

Yet three secondary obstacles threaten to undermine Iran’s desire to negotiate with Washington and Tel Aviv — obstacles extending from Sanaa to Baghdad and Beirut — in addition to the two principal obstacles: the nuclear program and long-range ballistic missiles.

It is not difficult to see that the three subsidiary obstacles are more manageable than the two central ones. It is increasingly plausible that efforts may begin to resolve the crises in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon as a “downpayment of goodwill” — or, perhaps more accurately, a “downpayment of leverage” — ahead of the larger negotiations.

In such a scenario, it would not be surprising for Tehran to show flexibility regarding the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, invoking the logic of necessary concessions that typically conclude any war, and using the pretext of ensuring its proxies’ presence in the negotiation rounds.

Everything suggests that Iran is avoiding war, and nothing suggests that it can withstand a new one — one that would inevitably be more painful and more damaging than the last, and one that might this time topple its regime, already weakened at home. For this reason, Iran seeks to try the only remaining option: negotiation, starting with its proxies, all while attempting to raise the value of the “deal” that would involve selling off those proxies — but at the highest possible price.