No sooner had Pope Leo XIV departed Lebanon than the trajectory of Lebanese–Israeli negotiations suddenly accelerated, almost as if in response to the motto of his visit: “Blessed are the peacemakers.” He had repeated calls for peace in every speech and sermon he delivered. But in his closed-door meetings with political and spiritual leaders, he went further, explicitly urging peace negotiations between Lebanon and Israel to reach an agreement that would end the war.

The first urgent step—which appeared to be a reaction to his appeal—was the surprising “injection” of two civilian figures into the Mechanism Committee. It later became clear, however, that the matter had in fact been under study for months, as President Joseph Aoun informed the Cabinet. Lebanon appointed its former ambassador to Washington, Simon Karam, as head of its negotiating team within the mechanism, while Israel appointed former security official Uri Reznik. The newly “expanded” committee held its first meeting in the presence of U.S. envoy Morgan Ortagus, and preparations are underway for a second meeting on the 19th of this month.

Initial assessments of Lebanese–Israeli dynamics following this “expansion” indicate that it is a tactical, temporary development meant to bolster negotiations and avoid war—not a strategic shift toward normalization or a peace agreement.

Lebanon’s objectives in these negotiations, which it views as purely technical and security-related rather than a prelude to peace talks or normalization, are the following: an end to Israeli attacks; a full Israeli withdrawal from occupied points in the south in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and U.N. Resolution 1701; the release of Lebanese detainees; and the strengthening of the state and army’s role in the south.

But Tel Aviv quickly described the step taken during the committee’s first meeting as an initial attempt to achieve “peace and economic cooperation,” tying any progress to the following conditions: the full disarmament of Hezbollah, securing the borders, and ending all threats. Israel even proposed replacing the idea of a military “buffer zone” with a “joint economic zone”—the so-called “Trump Economic Zone,” an idea floated by the former U.S. administration before the Gaza agreement.

A transition toward peace negotiations or full, direct normalization, however, appears unlikely in the foreseeable future for several reasons. Key Lebanese political actors reject transforming these discussions into negotiations over normalization or peace, and insist that any Lebanese move in that direction must align with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and a two-state solution. There is also no political readiness within Lebanon, given the unresolved issue of Hezbollah’s weapons and the deep divisions surrounding it. Any serious discussion of peace would require a solution to this issue first—something that remains unachievable at present. At the same time, U.S. and international pressure is pulling in the opposite direction, focusing on preventing war and supporting stability through technical measures rather than pushing Lebanon toward normalization, which could threaten the country’s fragile internal balance.

Some political circles note that the United States and Israel increasingly view the Lebanese and Syrian fronts as interconnected, though they prioritize Syria. Indeed, there are parallels between the two arenas, but they are not identical. Both tracks are driven by American efforts to stabilize southern Lebanon and Syria and to prevent any regional escalation that would threaten Washington’s interests. Meanwhile, both Lebanon and Syria seek tangible security goals—chiefly the cessation of Israeli attacks and an Israeli withdrawal from their southern territories—before any discussion of peace or normalization. Yet it is evident that Syrian–Israeli negotiations have progressed much further and are reportedly close to an agreement, while the Lebanese track remains at a very early stage.

Some analysts believe that the primary purpose of expanding the Mechanism Committee and launching negotiations is to manage the conflict and prevent war rather than resolve it. This means the future of the situation hinges on the mechanism’s ability to halt escalation and secure concrete security gains for Lebanon, at a minimum, stopping Israeli attacks and securing Israeli withdrawal from the points it currently occupies along the border.

Looking ahead, several possible scenarios emerge—two of which stand out, one plausible and the other likely:

— The “plausible” scenario: Israel could resort to major military escalation if it concludes that the political gains it stands to achieve from negotiations are limited. It may implement the military strike it has been hinting at for months in an attempt to impose its conditions.

— The “likely” scenario: The two sides may reach a compromise leading to an agreement on technical security arrangements, such as establishing a demilitarized zone south of the Litani River under international supervision, similar to proposals currently being discussed in the Syrian–Israeli negotiations.

Thus, the current trajectory may be described as walking along a narrow bridge suspended over the abyss of war. It may pave the way for temporary security arrangements, but the road toward lasting peace or normalization appears closed in the near future, due to the vast gap between the two sides’ positions and the internal and regional structural obstacles that stand in the way.