Only hours had passed since Pope Leo XIV departed Lebanon—after a profound spiritual-political visit held under the slogan “Blessed are the peacemakers”—when the contours of an extremely delicate new political phase began to emerge. A phase that effectively places Lebanon in an unprecedented test in its modern history: the test of shifting from the logic of a “fragile ceasefire” to the logic of “post-war management,” politically, economically, and security-wise… and perhaps diplomatically as well.

In less than 24 hours, three rapid developments occurred—none of which can be separated from the others. First was an unprecedented statement by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam linking any normalization with Israel to an economic track that would follow a peace agreement. Second was the fourteenth session of the “Mechanism” in Naqoura, held with civilian participation for the first time. Third was former ambassador Simon Karam’s official appointment—by decree from President General Joseph Aoun—to head Lebanon’s negotiating delegation.

These developments are not mere technical variations in managing the conflict; they reflect a structural shift in the Lebanese state’s approach to the southern border and its long-standing relationship with the decades-old conflict.

Nawaf Salam Opens the Door… But Only Conditional on Peace

When Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated explicitly that “economic talks will be part of any normalization process with Israel, which must follow a peace agreement,” he was not making a passing media remark. He was laying the cornerstone for a potential transformation in the function of the Lebanese state within the conflict equation.

Salam reaffirmed Lebanon’s commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, setting a clear condition: peace first… normalization later. Yet he also acknowledged, with sober political realism, that Lebanon “remains far” from that path.

Israel, meanwhile, responded quickly. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced the dispatch of an envoy to meet Lebanese officials “to lay the groundwork for economic relations and cooperation.” In practice, this means that Tel Aviv has begun shifting the idea of cooperation from a security-framed concept to a civil-economic one—even if only in preliminary steps.

The message is clear: Israel seeks to turn the ceasefire into a platform for economic negotiations, paving the way for broader tracks. Lebanon’s official position, however, is attempting a delicate middle path: no normalization without peace, but no total disengagement from the international negotiating process.

The “Mechanism” Moves from the Military to the Political

The most telling development was the convening of the Committee for Monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities—the “Mechanism”—in Naqoura, with civilians present for the first time. Participants included former Lebanese ambassador Simon Karam, Israel’s National Security Council member Uri Resnick, and the direct sponsorship of U.S. envoy Morgan Ortagus.

This shift from a purely military framework to a civil-political one means that the “Mechanism” is no longer just a security coordination chamber between two armies. It has become a preparatory platform for a long-term political-economic negotiation process.

The U.S. Embassy’s statement in Beirut was explicit about the objective:

“Facilitating political and military discussions aimed at achieving security, stability, and lasting peace for all communities affected by the conflict.”

In other words, Lebanon is no longer merely a battleground; it has become a subject of “future delineation”—not just border delineation.

The Meaning of Choosing Simon Karam

Appointing former ambassador Simon Karam to lead the Lebanese delegation is not an administrative detail—it is a distinctly political choice. Karam is a former diplomat in Washington, a former governor of Beirut and the Bekaa, a lawyer, a vocal critic of arms outside the state, and one of the early figures of opposition to Syrian tutelage. The state has selected a figure who is non-military, non-partisan, openly sovereignist, and internationally connected.

Politically relevant, too, is not just his profile, but his timing. In 1999, Karam predicted that Israel would withdraw from Lebanon before the year 2000—a claim dismissed at the time as exaggerated, yet proven correct. More recently, he warned that “the conditions for ending the war are more grievous than the war itself,” referring to the so-called “Support War”—again, a prescient assessment.

Where Does Hezbollah Stand in This Equation?

This is the central question. The latest Naqoura round took place more than a year after the ceasefire with Hezbollah, and after an intense wave of Israeli strikes that Tel Aviv says targeted “capacity rebuilding.” Yet Hezbollah was absent—formally and indirectly—from any representation or influence, even at the margins of the “Mechanism.”

What is increasingly evident is that the emerging formula rests on the following:

The state negotiates, the international community sponsors, Israel exerts pressure, and Hezbollah is gradually excluded politically and constrained functionally in the South.

The Pope and the State That Woke Up Late

The Pope’s visit cannot be separated from this context. His slogan, “Blessed are the peacemakers,” was not merely a spiritual exhortation; it was an ethical political signal that Lebanon stands at a crossroads: either it becomes a state that secures peace under the conditions of sovereignty, or it remains an open arena for others’ conflicts—conflicts that have drained it for the past five decades.

In the aftermath of the visit, we witnessed the state beginning to move: politically in Naqoura, diplomatically through Washington, and economically through conditional normalization channels. But the essential question remains:

Is the state acting from its own decision-making center… or from external pressure?

Lebanon Has Entered the Most Dangerous “Grey Zone.”

Lebanon today is not yet entering normalization, nor is it fully clinging to the “no-war, no-peace” formula. It stands in the most precarious space: between security and politics, between economy and sovereignty, between state authority and armed power, between international oversight and genuine independence.

It may be fair to say that the appointment of Simon Karam, the presence of Morgan Ortagus, and Nawaf Salam’s statements are not isolated events, but rather linked chapters in a single trajectory:

a trajectory to place Lebanon on the path of comprehensive negotiations, under the broad headline: “Ending the era of a South outside the state… and reintegrating it into the core of national decision-making, even at a steep regional cost.”