Israel’s operation in the Syrian town of Beit Jinn has deepened doubts about the possibility of reaching any ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian regime, despite the recent rapprochement between the head of that regime, Ahmad al-Shara, and U.S. President Donald Trump.

It is clear that Israel does not trust Damascus, regardless of all the assurances the latter has tried to send since the regime’s new leadership took power nearly a year ago. The most hardline government in Israel’s history has launched a gradual policy of striking the new regime—first from the air, then through ground incursions, and ultimately by imposing a new fait accompli that extends beyond Syria and reflects its broader regional vision.

It is therefore unsurprising that Israel seeks to keep the situation aflame, especially since it has encountered virtually no meaningful resistance.

The incident in Beit Jinn—a town in Quneitra targeted by the Israeli army, where 20 people were killed, several civilians wounded, and six Israeli soldiers injured—fits into Israel’s ongoing northern campaign against armed groups emerging from the new Syrian power structure.

This time, the factions are being labeled as the “Islamic Group.” Israel will no doubt adopt new labels in the future, as it intends to persist with these operations in various forms, especially with the country entering a fierce election year. Attacks on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from his political rivals are intensifying, alongside pressure from the right and the settler movement, all amid Netanyahu’s own crises—including his request for a presidential pardon on domestic charges and the International Criminal Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant against him.

These pressures help explain Netanyahu’s increasingly aggressive regional posture, his attempt to establish a long-term deterrence framework on the northern front, block any new armed entrenchment near the Golan Heights, and strip al-Sharaa of every card of influence.

In doing so, Netanyahu implicitly rejects any imminent agreement with Damascus—whether security- or politically-focused—unless it is on terms that Syria is incapable of meeting.

His formula is rooted in suppressing and deterring the adversary without sliding into a full-scale war, though he may resort to one if necessary.

Following the clash in Beit Jinn, Israel issued a warning that it would not accept a new dynamic of confrontation. It continued its incursions, with the air force playing a central role in striking a regime that Tel Aviv views as nothing more than a jihadist system in civilian clothing.

Netanyahu’s logic reinforces the notion that Syria remains a fragile and unstable arena, making any agreement or political understanding impossible at this stage.

Strong Domestic Support

Notably, the defensive campaign Netanyahu describes along the Syrian and Lebanese fronts enjoys broad support inside Israel. It aligns with the “security arguments” long employed by the military establishment to justify its continued heavy deployment on the eastern slopes of the occupied Golan Heights.

Israel has effectively withdrawn from the disengagement agreement signed with Syria in 1974 and has carried out the first wide-scale ground breach of Syrian territory since the October 1973 war, through persistent air and ground operations.

The agreement had stipulated Israel’s control west of the disengagement line—excluding Quneitra—while Syria controlled the east, with a UN-administered buffer zone in between. UN forces monitored the area until the collapse of the Assad regime. After that collapse, Israel announced on December 8, 2024, that the agreement was void due to the Syrian army’s withdrawal.

Israel named its incursions Operation Bashan Arrow, aimed at seizing the buffer zone. The most strategically significant gain was Mount Hermon, rising 2,800 meters above sea level, which granted Israel broad surveillance capability over the Syrian-Lebanese border. This advance enabled Israel to link its control points between Quneitra and Mount Hermon, a location of “critical security importance.”

Israel then established a new buffer zone stretching from the Damascus countryside to the Daraa countryside, alongside imposing a broader no-fly zone, bringing the total area under direct Israeli control or influence to approximately 500 square kilometers.

This expansion places Damascus in a difficult position, making it unable to enter into any form of agreement.

Druzes and Minorities: A Convenient Pretext

The Druze question has emerged as a major justification for Netanyahu’s campaign and as a means to portray al-Sharaa as powerless. There are around 120,000 Druze in Israel, many of whom serve in its army, and they maintain familial and religious connections with the Druze of Sweida. Israel has presented itself as their protector and claims to have “saved” them from massacres after deadly incidents that the Syrian government has denied responsibility for.

Israel has demanded the opening of a humanitarian corridor to Sweida to deliver aid. Calls for Druze secession have grown louder, and Israel now advocates the protection of all minorities—including Alawites, Kurds, and Christians—helping Netanyahu appear as a savior in the eyes of some Syrians.

The Syrian regime, meanwhile, reinforces this dynamic through ongoing instability, repeated assaults, and killings—even if Damascus denies involvement—which continue to occur in Druze, Alawite, Christian, and Shiite regions. Meanwhile, confrontation with Kurdish forces appears inevitable.

As for al-Sharaa, he risks both his image and his “legitimacy” among Syrians. Enforcing the rule of law against jihadist factions would make him appear subservient to Western demands, while he lacks the capacity to resist Israeli incursions.

This raises a pivotal question: How long can President Donald Trump prevent an escalation, especially given Turkey’s role as a primary sponsor of the regime’s rise and consolidation in Damascus?

In reality, while the Trump administration has embraced al-Sharaa as a pragmatic partner capable of stabilizing Syria, containing extremist threats—particularly ISIS—and bringing a former “axis of evil” state into the Western orbit, Israel views his rise as a major threat to its national security. Israeli officials argue that there is no precedent in Middle Eastern history of an extremist Islamist movement improving once it has taken power.

In recent weeks, Washington has succeeded in containing escalation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. The silence of Israeli officials following the Beit Jinn operation reflects their desire not to anger the Americans.

But this may be temporary. Divergence could resurface, especially if Israel argues—as it has before—that its proximity to the battlefield grants it a clearer understanding of the realities on the ground, as when it bombed Damascus.

Ultimately, Israel’s long-term bet remains on the fragility of Syrian unity and the likelihood of a future conflict leading to civil war and geographic fragmentation—a scenario in which the United States might find itself unable to counter a new reality on the ground.